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The constitutionality of ouster clauses: Nagaenthran
a/l K Dharmalingam v Attorney-General [2018] SGHC
112
Benjamin Joshua Ong
School of Law, Singapore Management University, Republic of Singapore
ABSTRACT
Section 33B(4) of Singapore’s Misuse of Drugs Act purportedly partly ousts
judicial review of the Public Prosecutor’s determination of whether a drug
traﬃcker has substantively assisted the anti-drug enforcement agency. This
paper argues that Singapore’s High Court erred in holding this provision
constitutionally valid. Ouster clauses are unconstitutional vis-à-vis Articles
12(1) and 93 of the Constitution; the High Court’s view does not accord with
the law on non-justiciability and is premised on a ﬂawed theory of legislative
intention. It is no answer that judicial power is subject to a ‘balance’ which
renders a partial ouster clause constitutionally valid. The High Court’s view
that section 33B(4) ousts review for non-jurisdictional errors of law is
incompatible with Article 93, and is not justiﬁed by the ‘green-light’ theory.
The eﬀect of these problems is tempered by a potentially wider deﬁnition of
unconstitutionality as a ground of review than the High Court considered.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 1 August 2018; Accepted 25 November 2018
1. Introduction
In Nagaenthran a/l K Dharmalingam v Attorney-General,1 the High Court had to
confront two important questions about ouster clauses in Singapore. The ﬁrst
was the issue of the extent to which the reasoning in the well-known case of
Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission2 applies. The second was
whether ouster clauses are in conﬂict with Article 93 of the Constitution of
the Republic of Singapore,3 which vests judicial power (exclusively) in the
© 2019 Faculty of Law, Oxford University
CONTACT Benjamin Joshua Ong benjaminjong@smu.edu.sg
1[2018] SGHC 112 (High Court of Singapore).
2[1969] 2 AC 147 (UK House of Lords (UKHL)). This case involved a statute which provided that ‘[t]he deter-
mination by the [Foreign Compensation Commission] of any application made to them under this Act
shall not be called in question in any court of law’. The House of Lords held that this statute did not
preclude judicial review of a determination which was allegedly tainted by an error of law which
brought the Commission out of its jurisdiction, for such a tainted determination was not a ‘determi-
nation’ within the meaning of the statute.
3Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 reprint of 1985 Rev Ed).
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courts.4 An added twist was that the ouster clause in question, rather than
purporting to oust the courts’ powers of judicial review entirely, purported
to restrict the grounds on which one may apply for judicial review. This
note aims to critically examine the High Court’s reasoning.
2. Background
Previously, under Singapore’s Misuse of Drugs Act (the Act),5 a person who
imported drugs above a certain threshold quantity would face a mandatory
death sentence.6 In 2012, the Act was amended to create the following excep-
tion:7 if two conditions were made out, such a person could be sentenced to
life imprisonment and caning instead of death. The ﬁrst was that the
oﬀender’s involvement in the oﬀence was limited to performing certain
tasks, such as transporting the drugs (as opposed to, say, playing a more
active role in the management of the drug traﬃcking syndicate).8 The
second condition was that ‘the Public Prosecutor certiﬁes to any court that,
in his determination, the person has substantively assisted the Central Narco-
tics Bureau in disrupting drug traﬃcking activities within or outside Singapore’
(hereafter, to issue a Certiﬁcate).9
Mr Nagaenthran a/l K Dharmalingam had been convicted of importing
heroin. Though he satisﬁed the ﬁrst condition just mentioned, he was sen-
tenced to death as the Public Prosecutor refused to issue him with a Cer-
tiﬁcate. He had tried but failed to challenge the constitutionality of the
requirement for a Certiﬁcate and the law that it was for the Public Prose-
cutor, acting in his discretion, to decide whether or not to issue a Certiﬁ-
cate.10 In Nagaenthran, he applied for judicial review of the Public
Prosecutor’s exercise of discretion on the grounds of failure to take into
account relevant considerations, absence of a precedent fact, and irration-
ality.11 The immediate obstacle he faced was section 33B(4) of the Act,
which, on its face, ousted judicial review on these grounds. Section 33B(4)
provides:
4The Singapore Court of Appeal (SGCA) noted this question in passing in Per Ah Seng Robin v Housing and
Development Board [2015] SGCA 62 [65]. The question had ﬁrst been asked by Thio Li-ann, A Treatise on
Singapore Constitutional Law (Academy Publishing 2012) para 10.218 and Chan Sek Keong, ‘Judicial
Review—From Angst to Empathy’ (2010) 22 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 469, 477.
5Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 rev ed).
6ibid s 33 read with the Second sch.
7ibid s 33B(1)(a) read with s 33B(2). For completeness, the Act also created another exception (which is not
discussed here) which pertains to drug traﬃckers who suﬀered from various types of abnormality of
mind: see s 33B(1)(b) read with s 33B(3).
8ibid s 33B(2)(a).
9ibid s 33B(2)(b).
10Nagaenthran was one of the applicants in Prabagaran a/l Srivijayan v Public Prosecutor [2016] SGCA 67.
For commentary on this case, see Benjamin Joshua Ong, ‘The Doctrine of Severability in Constitutional
Review: A Perspective from Singapore’ (2019) 40 Statute Law Review (forthcoming).
11Nagaenthran (n 1) [30].
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The determination of whether or not any person has substantively assisted the
Central Narcotics Bureau in disrupting drug traﬃcking activities shall be at the
sole discretion of the Public Prosecutor and no action or proceeding shall lie
against the Public Prosecutor in relation to any such determination unless it is
proved to the court that the determination was done in bad faith or with malice.
Nagaenthran sought to argue that the ouster clause was (a) unconstitutional;
and (b) ineffective because of the Anisminic principle.
The High Court found that, regardless of the eﬀect of section 33B(4),
Nagaenthran had not succeeded in raising even a prima facie case that any
of the alleged grounds of judicial review had been made out.12 Hence, the
High Court refused to grant leave to apply for judicial review. Nonetheless,
the High Court also responded to some of Nagaenthran’s submissions on
section 33B(4). The High Court held that the ouster clause was constitutionally
valid;13 but that, because of the Anisminic principle, the ouster clause did not
prevent judicial review on the ground that the Public Prosecutor had made a
jurisdictional error of law.14 However, the High Court declined to express a
conclusive view on whether all errors of law are jurisdictional errors of
law,15 although it expressed an inclination toward the view that some
errors of law are non-jurisdictional.16
We will now examine each of these issues in turn.
3. The (un)constitutionality of ouster clauses
Nagaenthran’s argument that section 33B(4) was unconstitutional was
founded on Article 93 of the Constitution, which provides:
The judicial power of Singapore shall be vested in a Supreme Court[17] and in
such subordinate courts as may be provided by any written law for the time
being in force.
The High Court stated that this provision had not been violated because
the Public Prosecutor’s discretion as to whether or not to issue a Certiﬁcate
was non-justiciable:18 in other words, it was a ‘matte[r] in respect of which
the judiciary is not properly able to exercise its judicial power over’.19
In support of this view, the High Court made two points. As we will see,






17The Supreme Court consists of the High Court and the Court of Appeal: Supreme Court of Judicature Act
(Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed), s 3. Applications for judicial review are made to the High Court in the ﬁrst
instance; an appeal then lies to the Court of Appeal.
18Nagaenthran (n 1) [93].
19ibid [86].
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generally, including section 33B(4), are unconstitutional because they are in
conﬂict with Article 93 of the Constitution. Further, it is no answer to argue
that, because section 33B(4) is only a ‘partial’ ouster clause that allows for
some grounds of judicial review, it can be justiﬁed on the ground that its
conﬂict with Article 93 represents a ‘reasonable balance’.
3.1. The institutional competence of the Public Prosecutor
First, the High Court said that the question of whether a Certiﬁcate ought to
be issued was non-justiciable. This was relevant for the following reason: if a
matter is non-justiciable, then judicial review would not be possible anyway
whether or not the ouster clause existed—the ouster clause would add
nothing to the law, but instead ‘merely declare accepted existing limits on
judicial review’.20 The problem is that this simply does not accord with the
law in Singapore on non-justiciability, according to which judicial review is
possible even in situations involving subject-matter which is said to be non-
justiciable. The High Court took ‘non-justiciable’ to mean that something
should not be reviewed at all. However, in Singapore, ‘non-justiciability’
means at most that the courts, while having the power to review, should
decline to exercise this power, or should perform review less intensively.
The High Court stated that ‘the Public Prosecutor… possess[es] the unique
qualities that render that oﬃce most suited to conduct the assessment under
s 33B(2)(b)’.21 This is unobjectionable insofar as it means that the courts may
not conduct that assessment in the place of the Public Prosecutor and substi-
tute their conclusion for the Public Prosecutor’s. However, it does not follow
that the Public Prosecutor’s exercise of discretion is totally unreviewable. It
is true that the Public Prosecutor possesses specialised knowledge in the
ﬁeld of how to disrupt drug traﬃcking activities and the ‘operational consider-
ations’ of the Central Narcotics Bureau (Singapore’s drug enforcement
agency).22 But the Singapore courts have recognised that ‘[t]here may… be
situations where the courts are able to isolate a pure question of law from
what may generally appear [to] be a non-justiciable area’.23
For example, the Court of Appeal has stated, in Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-
General, that ‘even for matters falling within the category of ‘high policy’,
the courts can inquire into whether decisions are made within the scope of
the relevant legal power or duty and arrived at in a legal manner’.24 (‘High
policy’ referred to such issues as ‘the recognition of foreign governments,
20ibid [78] citing Per Ah Seng Robin (n 4) [65], which in turn cites Hilaire Barnett, Understanding Public Law
(Routledge-Cavendish 2009) 194.
21Nagaenthran (n 1) [96].
22Muhammad Ridzuan bin Mohd Ali v Attorney-General [2015] SGCA 53 [56] read with [66] cited in Nagaen-
thran (n 1) [94].
23Lee Hsien Loong v Review Publishing Co Ltd [2007] SGHC 24 [98].
24[2015] SGCA 59 [106].
4 B. J. ONG
boundary disputes, sovereign immunity and the deployment of troops over-
seas’.)25 This explains why, in a previous case concerning national security, the
Court of Appeal stated that ‘matters of national security are not justiciable’,
and yet proceeded to perform judicial review on the ground of irrationality.26
If the courts are constitutionally competent to engage in review even in the
ﬁeld of such weighty aﬀairs of state, surely they must be well-suited to engage
in review in the ﬁeld of criminal acts such as drug traﬃcking. It does not
matter whether this ﬁeld is properly labelled ‘non-justiciable’. It must not be
forgotten that, notwithstanding the Public Prosecutor’s area of specialised
skill and knowledge, the courts possess their own specialised skill in the
area of supervising the executive by reference to such standards as procedural
fairness and the taking into account of relevant considerations.27 The High
Court’s reasoning only supports the point that the courts are not competent
to overrule the Public Prosecutor on the merits. It does not follow that the
courts ought not to engage in any form of judicial review at all save to the
limited extent explicitly provided for by statute.
3.2. Ouster clauses, common-law constitutional principles, and the
(ir)relevance of legislative intent
The second point which the High Court made is that the court ‘ought to defer
to the intention of the legislature in the vesting of certain powers in the execu-
tive’.28 It will now be argued that this is based on the questionable assumption
that judicial review is only available to the extent that the Legislature29 allows
it to be.
The High Court cited the Court of Appeal case of Yong Vui Kong v Attorney-
General,30 which stated that:
Where Singapore is concerned, I am of the view that by virtue of the judicial
power vested in the Supreme Court under Art 93 of the Singapore Constitution,
the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on every legal dispute on a
subject matter in respect of which Parliament has conferred jurisdiction on it,
including any constitutional dispute between the State and an individual. In
any modern State whose fundamental law is a written Constitution based on
the doctrine of separation of powers (ie, where the judicial power is vested in
25Lee Hsien Loong (n 23) [100] quoted in Tan Seet Eng (n 24) [102].
26Chan Hiang Leng Colin v Minister for Information and the Arts [1996] SGCA 7 [44]–[45].
27Of course, the weight to be accorded to those considerations is a matter for the executive decision-maker
to decide (provided that that decision is not Wednesbury unreasonable): Tesco Stores Ltd v Secretary of
State for the Environment [1995] 1 WLR 759 (UKHL) 764H.
28Nagaenthran (n 1) [88].
29The Legislature of Singapore consists of a unicameral Westminster-style Parliament and the President; as
the Constitution, art 58(1), provides, ‘the power of the Legislature to make laws [is] exercised by Bills
passed by Parliament and assented to by the President’. In this paper, ‘Legislature’ and ‘Parliament’
will be used interchangeably.
30Yong Vui Kong v Attorney-General [2011] SGCA 9.
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an independent judiciary), there will (or should) be few, if any, legal disputes
between the State and the people from which the judicial power is excluded.31
The High Court focused on the word ‘few’, holding that ‘there are ulti-
mately some legal disputes between the State and the people that
should properly be excluded from the province of judicial power’.32 This
might well be true to the extent that some matters are ‘intrinsically incap-
able of submission to an adjudication’33—this simply means, as stated
above, that the courts may not overrule the Public Prosecutor on the
merits as regards such matters. However, the extract above unfortunately
gives the impression that it is the Legislature which, through ordinary legis-
lation, dictates what these matters are. The High Court appears to have
thought so, stating that the Legislature, through section 33B(4), ‘exclude[d]
from the province of judicial power the review of the legality of the Public
Prosecutor’s determination’.34
How can it be that the Legislature can, by ordinary legislation, choose to
include or ‘exclud[e]’ certain matters ‘from the province of judicial power’?35
Article 93 of the Constitution vests ‘judicial power’ exclusively in the courts.
Therefore, surely, if anybody is to have the power to deﬁne ‘judicial power’,
it must be the framers of the Constitution at the time the Constitution was
drafted, and not the Legislature at any time by way of ordinary legislation.
Therefore, the assumption underlying the High Court’s decision is that the
phrase ‘judicial power’ in the Constitution refers only to such power as is
from time to time conferred on the Judiciary by the Legislature. This would
mean that the only reason why judicial review is ever possible is that the
Legislature allows it to be possible, and that the Legislature’s intention to
allow judicial review is constitutive of judicial power. One may certainly ques-
tion whether adopting such a theory in Singapore would leave Article 93 of
the Constitution with much meaningful content at all.36 Such a view, taken
to its logical conclusion, would instead leave the courts to stand idly by in
the face of an unlawful executive action: this cannot be correct.
In any event, such a view is excluded by the decision of the Court of Appeal
in Yong Vui Kong itself. In declaring that the exercise of the executive’s
31ibid [31] (Chan Sek Keong CJ, with whom Andrew Phang Boon Leong and V K Rajah JJA agreed at [188])
(emphasis as added by the High Court in Nagaenthran (n 1) [83]) <https://www.academia.edu/935298/
The_Theory_and_Practice_of_Judicial_Review_of_Administrative_Action_in_Singapore_Trends_and_
Perspectives> accessed 25 April 2019.
32Nagaenthran (n 1) [84] (emphasis in original).
33Nagaenthran (n 1) [85] citing Yong Vui Kong (n 30) [31], which in turn cites Melville Fuller Weston, ‘Pol-
itical Questions’ (1925) 38 Harvard Law Review 296, 299.
34Nagaenthran (n 1) [81].
35ibid.
36See generally Thio Li-ann, ‘The Theory and Practice of Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Singa-
pore: Trends and Perspectives’ in Yeo Tiong Min, Hans Tjio and Tang Hang Wu (eds), Developments in
Singapore Law between 2006 and 2010: Trends and Perspectives (Academy Publishing 2011), especially at
[87]–[91].
6 B. J. ONG
constitutional power of clemency is reviewable on various grounds,37 the
Court of Appeal relied not on legislative intention that such review be possible,
but instead on several common-law principles, namely: that ‘all legal powers,
even a constitutional power, have legal limits’;38 that powers must not be
exercised other than for certain intended purposes;39 and the common-law
tradition of natural justice.40 Since legislative intention that judicial review
be possible is not the reason why judicial review is possible, surely legislative
intention to oust or truncate judicial review ought also to be irrelevant.
One might think that the express words of a statute such as section 33B(4)
ought to trump such common-law principles. But that is not so, for these
common-law principles are constitutional principles. They are but elaborations
of Article 12(1) of the Constitution, which provides: ‘All persons are equal
before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law.’ This, according
to the Court of Appeal in Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Aﬀairs, demands
that the exercise of executive powers be subject to judicial review, for the arbi-
trary exercise of power is repugnant to Article 12(1):
[T]he submission by counsel… is that… if the discretion in ss 8 and 10 of the
[Internal Security Act] is subjective, that would allow arbitrary detention which
would result in inconsistency with Art 12(1). We accept this argument. We
would also note, however, that the provisions in ss 8 and 10 are not arbitrary
in themselves… Nevertheless, if the discretion is not subject to review by a court
of law, then, in our judgment, that discretion would be in actual fact as arbitrary
as if the provisions themselves do not restrict the discretion to any purpose and
to suggest otherwise would in our view be naive.41
On these grounds, the Court of Appeal rejected the view that a statutory
executive power to detain a person was validly exercised as long as the execu-
tive authority was subjectively satisﬁed of the necessity of detention, ‘so as to
exclude a judicial inquiry into the sufﬁciency of the grounds to justify the
detention’.42 A fortiori, section 33B(4), which explicitly excludes judicial
review on several well-established grounds, must be unconstitutional.
In Chng Suan Tze, the Court of Appeal went on to hold that the discretion in
question was reviewable in accordance with traditional common-law admin-
istrative law principles such as those in Padﬁeld v Minister of Agriculture, Fish-
eries and Food,43 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v Wednesbury
37Namely, that the exercise of the clemency power had taken place ‘beyond its legal limits (ie ultra vires
the enabling law)’; ‘mala ﬁde (ie for an extraneous purpose)’; in a manner that ‘contravenes consti-
tutional protections and rights’; or in a biased manner: Yong Vui Kong (n 30) [77], [111].
38Yong Vui Kong (n 30) [80] citing Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2007] SGHC 207 [149].
39Yong Vui Kong (n 30) [80] citing Tan Guat Neo Phyllis (n 38) [149].
40Yong Vui Kong (n 30) [108] and [111] read with [87]–[88].
41Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Aﬀairs [1988] SGCA 16 [82] (emphasis added).
42Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri (Minister of Home Aﬀairs) Malaysia [1969] 2 MLJ 129
(Federal Court of Malaysia) 150 cited in Chng Suan Tze (n 41) [52].
43[1968] AC 997 (UKHL) cited in Chng Suan Tze (n 41) [86].
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Corporation,44 and Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service.45
In so holding, the Court of Appeal was simply recognising that the grounds of
judicial review contained therein serve to prevent the arbitrary exercise of
executive power, which the Constitution, by virtue of Article 12(1),
demands. The High Court, with respect, ought to have engaged closely
with this clear authority for the proposition that traditional common-law judi-
cial review principles represent a set of judicial review principles which the
Court of Appeal has approved as passing constitutional muster, such that a
truncation of these principles (such as that purportedly eﬀected by section
33B(4)) may well fall short of the standards which Article 12 demands of judi-
cial review. (This is not to mention the potential for the further development of
judicial review principles which also seek to uphold Article 12(1) by preventing
arbitrary decision-making.)
3.3. Ouster clauses and judicial power
Seen in this light, the High Court’s treatment of the legislative intention
behind section 33B(4) is not defensible. What the High Court said was:
[The] judiciary, in recognition of its limited role in judicial review by dint of the
constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers, ought to defer to the inten-
tion of the legislature in the vesting of certain powers in the executive and respect
the relative institutional competence of the executive in respect of decisions
that concern issues that judges are ill-equipped to adjudicate.46
The problem with this is that the High Court did not state explicitly: compe-
tence to do what? On closer examination, it becomes clear that the High
Court had conﬂated two things: the legislature’s intention as to what the
limits to executive power are; and the legislature’s intention as to the
courts’ power to police those limits. With respect, this conﬂation is incorrect.
It is certainly true that the Legislature, being the conferrer of executive powers
through legislation, may choose to make those limits very wide. In practical
terms, the wider the limits, the rarer will be the case in which the power-
holder is held to have transgressed them. But the Legislature may not go
further and provide that the courts may not even direct their minds to
whether or not the limits have been transgressed. A statute to that effect,
including a statute like s 33B(4) which purports to oust the court’s jurisdiction
to perform judicial review on some grounds, is an unconstitutional depri-
vation of the courts’ judicial power, contrary to Article 93 of the Constitution.
44[1948] 1 KB 223 (Court of Appeal of England and Wales (EWCA)) cited in Chng Suan Tze (n 41) [119].
45[1985] AC 374 (UKHL) cited in Chng Suan Tze (n 41) [119].
46Nagaenthran (n 1) [88] (emphasis added).
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It is therefore ‘void’ by virtue of Article 4 of the Constitution.47 As Gleeson CJ
put it in the Australian case of Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia:
Parliament may create, and deﬁne, the duty, or the power, or the jurisdiction,
and determine the content of the law to be obeyed. But it cannot deprive this
Court of its constitutional jurisdiction to enforce the law so enacted.48
There are at least two possible ways to reach this conclusion.
First, to be a superior court of unlimited jurisdiction (such as the High
Court) exercising judicial power is to determine and pronounce upon the
limits of executive bodies’ powers. Support for this deﬁnition of judicial
power may be drawn from the following passage from Tan Seet Eng:
The rule of law is the bedrock on which our society was founded and on which it
has thrived. The term, the rule of law, is not one that admits of a ﬁxed or precise
deﬁnition. However, one of its core ideas is the notion that the power of the
State is vested in the various arms of government and that such power is
subject to legal limits. But it would be meaningless to speak of power being
limited were there no recourse to determine whether, how, and in what circum-
stances those limits had been exceeded. Under our system of government,
which is based on the Westminster model, that task falls upon the Judiciary.
Judges are entrusted with the task of ensuring that any exercise of state
power is done within legal limits.49
To the extent that the High Court is unable to perform this task, the High Court
has had its judicial power truncated. Again, it must be stressed that this is not
an encroachment on the Public Prosecutor’s proper sphere of authority. All it
means is that, however wide are the limits to his power, the courts must
ensure that the he does not transgress those limits.
Second, if a ‘non-judicial tribunal or other non-judicial decision-making
authority’ can ‘determine conclusively the limits of its own jurisdiction’, that
tribunal thereby, in eﬀect, exercises judicial power.50 As the Supreme Court
of Canada put it, there is ‘nothing that is more the hallmark of a superior
court than the vesting of power in a provincial statutory tribunal to determine
the limits of its jurisdiction without appeal or other review’.51 To accord such
power to the Public Prosecutor (or to any other executive authority) is contrary
47Article 4 reads: ‘This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic of Singapore and any law enacted
by the Legislature after the commencement of this Constitution which is inconsistent with this Consti-
tution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.’
48Plaintiﬀ S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2 (High Court of Australia) [5].
49Tan Seet Eng (n 24) [1].
50Plaintiﬀ S157/2002 (n 48) [73] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, and Hayne JJ). Similarly, the Supreme
Court of Canada held in Crevier v Attorney-General (Quebec) [1981] 2 SCR 220, 238 that ‘[i]t cannot be left
to a provincial statutory tribunal, in the face of s 96 [of the British North America Act], to determine the
limits of its own jurisdiction without appeal or review’. (The said s 96 provides: ‘The Governor General
shall appoint the Judges of the Superior, District, and County Courts in each Province, except those of
the Courts of Probate in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.’)
51Crevier (n 50) 237.
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to the proper reading of Article 93, which is that judicial power vests exclu-
sively in the courts.52
3.4. An unpalatable alternative
Might one say, to the contrary, that s 33B(4) is constitutionally valid because it
does not really oust or truncate the court’s role, but is instead simply a means
by which the Legislature has delimited the Public Prosecutor’s power? In other
words, can s 33B(4) be said to be merely the means through which the Leg-
islature has, as Gleeson CJ in Plaintiﬀ S157/2002 put it, ‘create[d], and deﬁne[d],
the… power, or the jurisdiction [of the Public Prosecutor], and determine[d]
the content of the law to be obeyed’?53
The answer must be no. If the answer were yes, it would follow that the
Legislature has chosen to set the boundaries of the Public Prosecutor’s
power in such a manner as to permit him to reach a determination which is
procedurally improper, fails to take into account relevant considerations or
which takes into account irrelevant considerations, is irrational, or is otherwise
ultra vires the scope of the enabling statute. Moreover, the Legislature must
have been free to choose to allow the Public Prosecutor to act in bad faith
and/or maliciously if it wished to; it is only by the Legislature’s generosity
that the Public Prosecutor is forbidden from so acting. As pernicious as this
would sound, this is the implication of the following passage from the High
Court’s judgment in Nagaenthran:
[A]nother reason why s 33B(4) of the MDA should be considered constitutionally
valid is that, even though the Public Prosecutor’s determination under s 33B
(2)(b) is one that is non-justiciable, Parliament has notably still elected to
provide for limited review of the Public Prosecutor’s determination on the
grounds of bad faith and malice. In other words, s 33B(4) is not a complete
ouster clause, but a mere partial ouster clause. It thus appears fair, in the circum-
stances, to ﬁnd that Parliament has in fact legislated to provide [a] ‘reasonable
balance’.54
For the reasons stated above, it is submitted that the true reason why the
Public Prosecutor’s exercise of discretion ought to be held to be reviewable on
the grounds of bad faith and malice is not that Parliament has chosen to allow
such review to take place, but simply that: (a) these are established justiciable
legal limits to the exercise of executive power; (b) the courts, in the exercise of
judicial power, must enforce these limits. There is no reason why this logic
ought not to apply to other established legal limits, such as that executive
power must not be exercised in breach of natural justice, on the basis of irre-
levant considerations, or in a Wednesbury unreasonable manner.
52Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu v Public Prosecutor [2012] SGHC 163 [17].
53Plaintiﬀ S157/2002 (n 48) [5] (Gleeson CJ).
54Nagaenthran (n 1) [98] (emphasis added).
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3.5. Ouster clauses and the rule of law: a historical view
In fact, the Legislature has tacitly agreed with the view that ouster clauses are
unconstitutional, as may be seen from its behaviour vis-à-vis the Internal
Security Act. In Chng Suan Tze, the Court of Appeal reviewed (and quashed)
the applicants’ detention under the Internal Security Act, pointing out that
there was ‘no ouster clause’ in that Act.55 Subsequently, the Legislature
added an ouster clause to the Internal Security Act.56 At the same time, the
Legislature, in the exercise of its constituent power, enacted Article 149(3)
of the Constitution, which speciﬁcally provided that the ouster clause con-
tained in emergency and anti-subversion legislation (including the Internal
Security Act) is to be immunised from challenge under Article 93.57
It is telling that the Legislature saw the need to go to such lengths to immu-
nise an ouster clause from challenge under Article 93, which must evince a
view on the part of the Legislature that an ouster clause is otherwise a
prima facie violation of Article 93. In so doing, the Legislature ‘implicitly
endorsed’ the general principle58 that ‘[a]ll power has legal limits and the
rule of law demands that the courts should be able to examine the exercise
of discretionary power’.59 These views were held by the Legislature qua con-
stituent assembly, and must therefore trump subsequent views held by the
Legislature in the course of passing ordinary legislation such as section 33B(4).
Moreover, even then, the Court of Appeal explicitly declined to hold
that the ouster clause in the Internal Security Act, while purporting to
exclude a ‘judicial enquiry into the suﬃciency of the grounds to justify the
55Chng Suan Tze (n 41) [86].
56The Internal Security Act (Cap 143, 1985 Rev Ed), s 8B states that, save for ‘any question relating to com-
pliance with any procedural requirement of this Act’, ‘the law governing the judicial review of any
decision made or act done in pursuance of any power conferred upon the President or the Minister
by the provisions of this Act shall be the same as was applicable and declared in Singapore on the
13th day of July 1971; and no part of the law before, on or after that date of any other country in
the Commonwealth relating to judicial review shall apply’. According to the Court of Appeal in Teo
Soh Lung v Minister for Home Aﬀairs [1990] SGCA 5, the law which ‘was applicable and declared in Sin-
gapore on the 13th day of July 1971’ refers to the statement in Lee Mau Seng v Minister for Home Aﬀairs
[1971] SGHC 10 [54]–[55] that the power of preventive detention is to be ‘exercised on the sole respon-
sibility of the highest executive body, ie the President acting in accordance with the advice of the
Cabinet, whose discretion is ﬁnal’ and is not subject to ‘a judicial enquiry into the suﬃciency of the
grounds to justify the detention’.
57The Constitution, art 149 relates to legislation which ‘recites that action has been taken or threatened by
any substantial body of persons, whether inside or outside Singapore—(a) to cause, or to cause a sub-
stantial number of citizens to fear, organised violence against persons or property; (b) to excite disaﬀec-
tion against the President or the Government; (c) to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between
diﬀerent races or other classes of the population likely to cause violence; (d) to procure the alteration,
otherwise than by lawful means, of anything by law established; or (e) which is prejudicial to the security
of Singapore’. The Internal Security Act is such legislation. Under art 149(3), ‘[i]f… any question arises in
any court as to the validity of any decision made or act done in pursuance of any power conferred upon
the President or the Minister’ by such legislation, ‘such question shall be determined in accordance with
the provisions of any law as may be enacted by Parliament for this purpose; and nothing in Article 93
shall invalidate’ such a provision. The ‘provision’ in question is s 8B of the Internal Security Act.
58Yong Vui Kong (n 30) [79].
59Chng Suan Tze (n 41) [86].
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detention’,60 necessarily excludes the power of judicial review in a case where
‘a person is detained for reasons which have nothing to do with national
security’61—such as by reason only of having ‘red hair’62 (a classic example
of Wednesbury irrationality).63
In short, the intention of the Legislature qua framer of the Constitution is as
follows. First, ousting judicial review is incompatible with Article 93 of the Con-
stitution. Second, this cannot be overcome by anything short of an explicit
constitutional provision to the contrary. The courts have added that even in
the presence of such a constitutional provision, even what appears at ﬁrst
glance to be a statutory provision completely ousting judicial review may
not be treated as such. It is regrettable that the High Court in Nagaenthran
did not engage thoroughly with these points. Instead, the High Court
stated that:
[T]he applicant’s objection that s 33B(4) is in contravention of the rule of law also
lacks any merit, given that it has been amply demonstrated that s 33B(4) in fact
imposes appropriate limits on the discretion of the Public Prosecutor in issuing
certiﬁcates of substantive assistance by allowing for limited judicial review, such
that it cannot be said that the Public Prosecutor has unfettered discretion in this
regard.64
This passage gives insuﬃcient weight to the importance of judicial review
in upholding the rule of law and the centrality of judicial review to judicial
power. Its only response is to point to the fact that judicial review is at least
possible on some grounds. Taken to its extreme, this reasoning would turn
constitutional supremacy on its head. Its eﬀect is that, instead of the consti-
tutional principle of the rule of law giving rise to a reluctance (both legislative
and judicial) to truncate judicial review,65 it is ordinary legislation which dic-
tates the content and extent of the rule of law. This risks paving the way
for a tokenistic version of the rule of law which is satisﬁed as long as there
is some legal limit, however small, on executive power.
3.6. Ouster clauses are not saved by the idea of a ‘reasonable
balance’ of judicial power
Let us next consider the argument that this risk did not eventuate in Nagaen-
thran because, to the extent that section 33B(4) has ousted judicial power,
such ousting is justiﬁable as it has struck a ‘reasonable balance’ by preserving
judicial review on certain grounds.66
60Lee Mau Seng (n 56) [54].
61Teo Soh Lung (n 56) [26].
62ibid [25] read with [15].
63Wednesbury (n 44) discussing Short v Poole Corporation [1926] Ch 66 (EWCA) 90–91.
64Nagaenthran (n 1) [97].
65Chng Suan Tze (n 41) [86].
66Nagaenthran (n 1) [98].
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The immediately apparent point is that the court did not explain exactly
what a ‘reasonable balance’ might entail. The High Court did not provide
any explanation for stating why the ‘balance’ was ‘reasonable’,67 other than
that, as we have observed, some ground of judicial review (however small)
was available. That would mean that any ‘partial’ ouster clause would ipso
facto be constitutional, however large the inroad it makes into judicial power.
There is a more fundamental point. It is, with respect, not clear why a
‘balance’ ought to be relevant at all. It might have been relevant if the appli-
cable legal framework had been one of persons’ right to judicial review. This
may be illustrated by jurisprudence from New Zealand. In some cases, ouster
clauses were challenged on the basis of section 27(2) of the New Zealand Bill
of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA), which provides:
Every person whose rights, obligations, or interests protected or recognised by
law have been aﬀected by a determination of any tribunal or other public auth-
ority has the right to apply, in accordance with law, for judicial review of that
determination.
Accordingly, access to judicial review is subject to the usual concepts relevant
to the adjudication of rights claims, such as proportionality analysis of statu-
tory limitations to the right.
For example, in Mangawhai Ratepayers and Residents Association Inc v
Kaipara District Council, Miller J (albeit in the minority of the New Zealand
Court of Appeal) would have ‘defer[red] to Parliament on the question of jus-
tiﬁcation’ by according Parliament a ‘substantial margin of appreciation’,68
and so held that the ouster clause was ‘proportional to the legislative objec-
tive’ and therefore a ‘reasonable and demonstrably justiﬁed’ limit on the
right.69 So, too, would the New Zealand Court of Appeal in AFFCO New
Zealand Limited v Employment Court, had it held that the right in section 27
(2) had prima facie been infringed.70
It is in that context that the concept of ‘balancing’ is appropriate, for rights,
by their nature, stand to be balanced. But the Singapore Constitution does not
take the approach of making judicial review a right. Rather, it speaks of
67Lee Zhe Xu, ‘When Is an Ouster Clause Ousted?’ Singapore Law Blog (6 July 2018) <www.
singaporelawblog.sg/blog/article/214> accessed 6 October 2018.
68[2015] NZCA 612 (New Zealand Court of Appeal) [100] (Miller J).
69ibid (n 68) [110]–[111] (Miller J).
70[2017] NZCA 123. The Court of Appeal held that s 27(2) of the NZBORA had not been breached. But it
suggested that this was because ‘[t]he right to apply for judicial review under s 27(2) [of the NZBORA] is
expressed to be a right exercisable only “in accordance with law”’, and the statute had conferred judicial
review jurisdiction only on the Court of Appeal, which, being a ‘creature of statute’, ‘has no inherent
jurisdiction and unlike the High Court it does not have a general supervisory jurisdiction to review
the decisions of public bodies’: [35]. This suggests that s 27(2) may prima facie have been breached
if the statute in question had not provided that the application for judicial review ‘must be made to
… the Court of Appeal’: [20]. (On a side note, the Court of Appeal’s reasoning is open to question as
it does not address the compliance with s 27(2) of the statute’s requirement that judicial review appli-
cations be made only to the Court of Appeal and not to the High Court.)
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authority to engage of judicial review through Article 93: ‘The judicial power of
Singapore shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in such subordinate courts
as may be provided by any written law for the time being in force.’ There is no
mention of any balancing, any truncation of judicial power, or any transfer of
judicial power to other bodies;71 nor can there be, for the Constitution confers
judicial power on the courts in absolute terms. Therefore, the High Court erred
in using the concept of ‘balancing’ of restrictions on judicial power or transfers
of judicial power to other bodies to justify the existence of section 33B(4) and
render it constitutional.
Neither is the concept of ‘balancing’ warranted by the nascent doctrine of
‘co-equality’, to which the High Court had referred in passing.72 On Swati Jha-
veri’s account, according to the principle of ‘co-equality’ there is scope for ‘sig-
niﬁcant give-and-take between the Judiciary and Executive’.73 According to
Jhaveri, the doctrine of ‘co-equality’ guides the court in striking a ‘balance
between the two branches’74 by exercising judicial review with appropriate
intensity while still leaving a ‘signiﬁcant amount of decisional space… to
the Executive’,75 instead of placing either branch above the other in a ‘hierar-
chy’.76 This might explain why the court may choose to attenuate the intensity
of the application of each ground of judicial review. This would simply be a
recognition of the inherent limitations of the judicial role. For example, it
would inherently be diﬃcult for the courts to conclude that there is
suﬃcient evidence that the Public Prosecutor has given insuﬃcient weight
to relevant considerations. This is because the Judiciary, unlike the Executive,
lacks the competence to determine what weight is to be given to various con-
siderations in maintaining the ﬁght against the drugs are. It is in this sense that
the Judiciary is to seek a ‘balance’.
But it does not follow that the ‘co-equality’ theory must necessarily lean in
favour of the Executive. According to the High Court, the ‘co-equal status of
the prosecutorial power and the judicial power’ justiﬁed the application of
the maxim ‘omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta (ie, all things are presumed to
have been done rightly and regularly until the contrary is shown)’.77 But
this in and of itself tells us little, for the question is precisely what it will
take for the ‘contrary [to be] shown’. It is true that, for example, it may take
a great deal to convince the courts that the executive’s decision has been
irrational, for the Executive is, to put it bluntly, the ‘expert’ in that regard.
But is the court not the specialist par excellence in, say, what constitutes a
71To the contrary, judicial power is vested exclusively in the courts:Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu (n 52) [17].
72Nagaenthran (n 1) [60], [89](d).
73Swati Jhaveri, ‘Localising Administrative Law in Singapore: Embracing Inter-branch Equality’ (2017) 29




77Nagaenthran (n 1) [61].
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fair hearing? In this regard, as Jhaveri points out, co-equality is a principle that
may operate not only to ‘restrict the scope of judicial review’,78 but also to
justify the court ‘stepping into a stronger role’.79 To the contrary, the High
Court’s decision uses the concept of a ‘reasonable balance’ only to weaken
the court’s role, and does not even consider situations in which the ‘reason-
able balance’ ought to weigh in favour of more intense review.
Instead, the High Court’s decision uses the concept of a ‘reasonable
balance’ to justify the courts’ completely disabling themselves from quashing
a decision tainted by irrationality, irrelevant considerations, etc.—even if
these grounds have been clearly made out. Far from recognising the ‘co-equal-
ity’ of branches, this eﬀectively places the Executive in an exalted status over
the Judiciary, as the Executive would be able to escape scrutiny in respect of
even demonstrably unlawful action. It is one thing to claim that ‘co-equality’
requires that the ‘acts of high oﬃcials of state [including the Public Prosecu-
tor] should be accorded a presumption of legality or regularity’.80 But it is
quite another to claim that, even in the event that this presumption
(however strong it may be) has been successfully rebutted, the courts may
nonetheless do nothing. The point of co-equality is that, even as the Execu-
tive has its role, the ‘speciﬁc responsibility for pronouncing on the legality of
government actions falls on the Judiciary’.81 Upholding an ouster clause—
even a ‘partial’ ouster clause—would, contrary to the rule of law, disable
the Judiciary from ‘pronouncing on the legality of government actions’
even in the event that the said actions are manifestly unlawful. Given this,
it can be no answer to argue that the Legislature has, by an act of grace,
nonetheless allowed the Judiciary to perform its role in respect of just
some types of unlawfulness.
3.7. Conclusion on the constitutionality of section 33B(4)
For all these reasons, the High Court’s reasoning that section 33B(4) is compa-
tible with Article 93 of the Constitution cannot be supported. The High Court
concluded that ‘s 33B(4) is in fact an exemplar of the separation of powers
principle in action’.82 This is certainly true in one sense: it prevents the
courts from intruding into the sphere of the Public Prosecutor’s sphere of
executive power. However, in its focus on this point, the High Court neglected
to engage carefully with other facts of the separation of powers, such as the
need to prevent the Legislature from withholding judicial power from the
courts as and when it sees ﬁt.
78Jhaveri (n 73) 836.
79ibid 839 (emphasis added).
80Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General [2012] SGCA 2 [46] cited in Nagaenthran (n 1) [60].
81Tan Seet Eng (n 24) [90].
82Nagaenthran (n 1) [97].
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4. The Anisminic principle
After discussing the constitutionality of section 33B(4), the High Court then
discussed the Anisminic principle and stated:
[A]n administrative determination that has been tainted by a jurisdictional error
of law should indeed be considered a nullity, with the eﬀect that an ouster
clause is ineﬀective in ousting the jurisdiction of the courts in reviewing the
determination on the basis of that particular error of law.83
4.1. The Anisminic principle vis-à-vis the constitutional point
Given its decision on the constitutional point, one might wonder why the
High Court considered the Anisminic issue at all. As we have seen, the High
Court held that the Legislature had eﬀectively ‘exclude[d] from the province
of judicial power the review of the legality of the Public Prosecutor’s determi-
nation regarding whether to issue a certiﬁcate of substantive assistance’,84
and that this exclusion was for good reasons. If the High Court had been so
concerned to uphold the will of Parliament as regards the courts’ power to
review the Public Prosecutor’s determination, how could it then be that the
courts may underhandedly undermine that same Parliamentary will by refer-
ence to the common-law doctrine in Anisminic?
In other words, the High Court, by considering the Anisminic issue after the
constitutional issue, eﬀectively proceeded on the basis that both Article 93 of
the Constitution and the Anisminic doctrine are alternative reasons, of equal
standing, to disapply what is ostensibly an ouster clause. With respect, this
approach is conceptually mistaken. Constitutional supremacy demands that
the common law, including the common law relating to the Anisminic issue,
must itself be tested for its constitutionality.
Because of the High Court’s considering the Anisminic issue in isolation
from the constitutional issue, the discussion of the scope of the Anisminic prin-
ciple was deprived of an important dimension. The High Court, in asking
‘whether all errors of law should be considered jurisdictional errors of law
which would cause administrative determinations tainted by them to be con-
sidered nullities’,85 unfortunately did not consider whether the answer might
lie in Article 93 of the Constitution.
Article 93 arguably demands that all errors of law be considered jurisdic-
tional errors of law. This is for the following reason. According to Article 93
of the Constitution, the courts (and only the courts) have judicial power.
Judicial power must include the power to state the law authoritatively:
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which carries with it the power to pronounce authoritatively and conclus-
ively on the meaning of the Constitution and all other laws’.86 Therefore,
there can be no such thing as an error of law which the executive has
the jurisdiction to commit, for that would amount in eﬀect either to allow-
ing the executive to state the law authoritatively—in other words, to exer-
cise judicial power—or to allowing the executive to get away with breaking
the law.87 On this latter point, it is useful to refer to the remarks of Lord
Griﬃths in Page:
The purpose [of judicial review] is to ensure that those bodies that are sus-
ceptible to judicial review have carried out their public duties in the way it
was intended they should. In the case of bodies other than courts, in so far
as they are required to apply the law they are required to apply the law cor-
rectly. If they apply the law incorrectly they have not performed their duty
correctly.88
4.2. The scope of the Anisminic principle: the High Court’s reference
to the ‘green-light’ theory of administrative law
The High Court in Nagaenthran did not engage with this point. To some
extent, the reason for this is that the High Court did not have the beneﬁt of
counsel’s submissions on this matter.89 Nonetheless, the High Court oﬀered
the following preliminary remark:
86Tan Seet Eng (n 24) [90]. See also Marbury v Madison 5 US 137 (1803) (US Supreme Court) 177: ‘It is
emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule.’
87Support for this view may also be drawn from R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28 [111], where Lord
Dyson agreed with de Smith’s Judicial Review (6th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2007) para 4-046 that ‘[t]he dis-
tinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error is ultimately based on foundations of sand.
Much of the super-structure had already crumbled. What remains is likely quickly to fall away as the
courts rightly insist that all administrative actions should be simply, lawful, whether or not jurisdictionally
lawful’. Signs of such ‘crumbling’ may be seen in O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237 (UKHL) 278E (Lord
Diplock); R v Lord President of the Privy Council, ex parte Page [1993] AC 682 (UKHL) 701F (Lord Browne-Wilk-
inson); Cart (n 87) [33] (Lady Hale). Cases seemingly to the contrary such as Page (n 87) and R (Privacy Inter-
national) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2017] EWCACiv 1868 (EWCA), which suggest that there are bodies
whose decisions are not reviewable on the grounds of error of law, may not only be distinguished on the
ground that theUKhasnoequivalent of Article 93 of Singapore’s Constitution, butmay also be explainedon
the basis that these bodies are in reality exercising judicial and not executive power: see Robert Craig, ‘The
Fall-out from Evans: Positioning Roszkowski and Privacy International in a Post-Evans Constitutional Land-
scape (Part 2)’UK Constitutional LawBlog (11 December 2017) <www.ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/12/11/
robert-craig-the-fall-out-from-evans-positioning-roszkowski-and-privacy-international-in-a-post-evans-
constitutional-landscape-part-2> accessed 30 July 2018. See also Paul Daly, ‘Thinking Again About Ouster
Clauses: R (Privacy International) v Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary [2017] EWCA Civ 1868’ Administra-
tive Law Matters (10 January 2018) <www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2018/01/10/thinking-
again-about-ouster-clauses-r-privacy-international-v-foreign-and-commonwealth-secretary-2017-ewca-
civ-1868> accessed 30 July 2018; Thomas Fairclough, ‘Privacy International: Constitutional Substance over
Semantics in Reading Ouster Clauses’ UK Constitutional Law Blog (4 December 2017) <www.
ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/12/04/thomas-fairclough-privacy-international-constitutional-substance-
over-semantics-in-reading-ouster-clauses> accessed 30 July 2018.
88Page (n 87) 693B.
89Nagaenthran (n 1) [119].
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[A] situation where any administrative decision, when tainted by an error of law,
can easily be construed as a nullity would not appear to be aligned with the
‘green-light’ approach towards administrative law, which is presently the most
accurate reﬂection of the socio-political attitude in the existing Singaporemilieu.90
A reader not familiar with the Singapore jurisdiction may be puzzled by a
judicial reference to Harlow and Rawlings’s ‘green-light’ (and ‘red-light’)
models.91 Singapore may well be the only common-law jurisdiction whose
courts have not only cited these models, but also endorsed one of them.
The models were brought to prominence in the Singaporean literature by
then-Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong, who in a 2012 lecture deﬁned the
‘green-light’ approach’ as one which ‘sees public administration not as a
necessary evil but a positive attribute, and the objective of administrative
law as not (primarily) to stop bad administrative practices but to encourage
good ones’, and suggested that such an approach is ‘more appropriate for Sin-
gapore’.92 This notion found its way into the case law: in a 2013 case, the Court
of Appeal quoted this lecture and suggested that the ‘green-light’ model
explains the Singapore courts’ restrictive approach toward locus standi.93 In
this manner, a descriptive model started to be treated as a prescriptive
theory.94
In Nagaenthran, the High Court explicitly relied on the ‘green-light’ model
as a possible justiﬁcation for holding that not all errors of law are jurisdictional.
With respect, such a view is a distortion of the ‘green-light’model, and should
be rejected. As Eugene K B Tan points out:
[A] binary categorisation of the curial role in judicial review [as either ‘red-light’
or ‘green-light’] runs the risk of being simplistic, if not misleading. A court motiv-
ated by a green-light approach is not going to act diﬀerently from any other
court where the administrative action complained of is unlawful or unconstitu-
tional or when a legislative provision is unconstitutional.95
Similarly, as Lee Zhe Xu puts it:
[The ‘green-light’ model] only requires that judicial review not be decoupled
from the fundamental precepts of adversarial litigation (see Jeyaretnam
Kenneth at [47]–[48]), i.e. that the rules of standing should not be unduly
90ibid [123].
91See Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press
2009) ch 1.
92Chan (n 4) 480.
93Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v Attorney-General [2013] SGCA 56 [47]–[50].
94For discussion, see Benjamin Joshua Ong, ‘Public Law Theory and Judicial Review in Singapore’ Singapore
Law Watch Commentary, Issue 1/Dec 2013 <ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2451> accessed 1 March
2019.
95Eugene K B Tan, ‘Curial Deference in Singapore Public Law: Autochthonous Evolution to Buttress Good
Governance and the Rule of Law’ (2017) 29 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 800, 806. See also Chen
Zhida, ‘The Nature of Judicial Review in Singapore’ (2013) 31 Singapore Law Review 79, 97: ‘Notwith-
standing the green-light theory of administrative law, the judicial review of the exercise of discretionary
power must remain within the domain of the Judiciary, unless speciﬁcally excluded by the Constitution.’
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loosened and that judicial review should focus on vindicating individual rights,
not matters of public policy (see Jeyaretnam Kenneth at [55]–[56]). It does not
require that the courts continue to hold back even when some irregularity in
the decision-making process has been proven, which is what Nagaenthran
appears to suggest.96
Chief Justice Chan himself recognised this point in his lecture:
[A] court, if it chooses not to follow the Anisminic logic, will ﬁnd that its jurisdic-
tion can always be ousted by Parliament, which may not be conducive to good
administration, even on a green-light view.97
In other words, the ‘green-light’ model is not a licence for the courts to stand
idly by in the face of an error of law—which is the area in which the courts
must, by virtue of their institutional competence and constitutional authority,
have the last word. The ‘green-light’model, even if it may be taken to be pre-
scriptive rather than descriptive, at most advocates a greater level of defer-
ence to the executive in considering the question of whether the executive
has committed an error of law.98 It cannot warrant a judicial refusal to consider
that question in the ﬁrst place.
Indeed, one might well say that the role of the courts in the ‘green-light’
model, which the High Court said was to ‘hel[p] to articulate clear rules and
principles which the government may abide by and conform to’,99 would
be better served if the ouster clause were not eﬀective, for then the court
would be in a position to articulate guidance on matter such as the various
considerations which are relevant and irrelevant to the executive’s exercise
of discretionary power and the norms of procedural fairness to which the
executive ought to adhere.
5. Broadening the scope of judicial review on the ground of
unconstitutionality
We have argued that the High Court erred in deciding as it did on the ouster
clause. However, even if the critical comments above were to be rejected, the
scope of judicial review of the Public Prosecutor’s discretion ought yet to be
broader than it was suggested in Nagaenthran to be. The High Court accepted
that section 33B(4) allows judicial review on the grounds of bad faith, malice,
and unconstitutionality.100 As for this last ground of review, the applicant
96Lee (n 67).
97Chan (n 4) 480.
98Chen (n 95) 93ﬀ. Note also the author’s argument at 97: ‘Notwithstanding the green-light theory of
administrative law, the judicial review of the exercise of discretionary power must remain within the
domain of the Judiciary, unless speciﬁcally excluded by the Constitution.’
99Nagaenthran (n 1) [123].
100ibid [2] citing Muhammad Ridzuan bin Mohd Ali (n 22) [35]. Although unconstitutionality is not one of
the grounds of review mentioned explicitly in s 33B(4), ‘[t]his ground of review ﬂows from the doctrine
of constitutional supremacy’: Muhammad Ridzuan bin Mohd Ali (n 22) [35].
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claimed that the Public Prosecutor had acted unconstitutionally due to non-
compliance with the constitutional provisions creating the rights to life and
to equality before the law.101 However, an examination of the case law
reveals a deﬁnition of ‘unconstitutionality’ which is broader than simple
non-compliance with the terms of constitutional provisions.
In the 2008 case of Tan Guat Neo Phyllis, the High Court stated that the
courts have the power to ‘prevent the prosecutorial power from being exer-
cised unconstitutionally’.102 However, the High Court went on to deﬁne
‘unconstitutional exercise of prosecutorial power’103 to include not only ‘con-
traven[ing] constitutional rights’, but also the use of prosecutorial power ‘in
bad faith for an extraneous purpose’.104 This subtle move is of crucial impor-
tance because it tacitly recognised that there are constitutional norms other
than those explicitly stated in the Constitution which constrain executive
(and, it would stand to reason, legislative) power.
It is important to note that this was not a simple application of the classic
administrative-law grounds of review of ‘bad faith’105 or ‘improper pur-
poses’.106 The Court of Appeal did not take the view that exercises of prose-
cutorial discretion are, like any exercises of executive discretion, reviewable on
the traditional administrative law grounds. Instead, it treated prosecutorial
discretion as being subject to a diﬀerent, sui generis, set of grounds of
review: ‘except for unconstitutionality, the Attorney-General has an unfettered
discretion as to when and how he exercises his prosecutorial powers’.107
Therefore, the only way to make sense of the grounds of appeal recognised
in that case was that the Court of Appeal had elevated these administra-
tive-law norms to constitutional status, and so broadened the deﬁnition of
‘unconstitutionality’.
Subsequently, in Yong Vui Kong, the Court of Appeal held that the exercise
of the clemency power was reviewable ‘on the same legal basis’ as that stated
in Phyllis Tan in relation to the prosecutorial power.108 The Court of Appeal
went on to make several more statements:
(1) Because the clemency process in death penalty cases required that
various materials be placed before the Cabinet,109 there is a ‘constitutional
101Nagaenthran (n 1) [59] referring to Articles 9(1) and 12(1) of the Constitution.
102Tan Guat Neo Phyllis (n 38) [146]. It should be noted that the High Court was constituted by three judges
instead of the usual one, which gives this case especial precedential value as a three-judge High Court is
a ‘de facto Court of Appeal’: Chew Eng Han v Public Prosecutor [2017] SGCA 60 [47] (emphasis in original
omitted).
103Tan Guat Neo Phyllis (n 38) [148].
104ibid.
105See eg Teng Fuh Holdings Pte Ltd v Collector of Land Revenue [2007] SGCA 14 [38].
106See eg Public Prosecutor v Pillay M M [1977] SGHC 7; Chng Suan Tze (n 41) [86].
107Tan Guat Neo Phyllis (n 38) [145].
108Yong Vui Kong (n 30) [80].
109The Constitution, art 22P(2).
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duty on the Cabinet’s part to consider those materials impartially and in
good faith before it advises the President on the exercise of the clemency
power’,110 breach of which would render the decision unlawful.111
(2) The making of clemency decisions is subject to the ‘administrative law
rules of natural justice’ (save to the extent that they were inconsistent
with the terms of the Constitutional provisions governing the exercise
of clemency power).112
(3) The Cabinet was not entitled to decide the question of clemency by
‘merely toss[ing] a coin’, nor by ‘never me[eting] to consider the
oﬀender’s case at all’.113
Again, the only way to make sense of all these remarks is to conclude that
the deﬁnition of unconstitutionality includes not only violation of consti-
tutional rights, but also such things as bad faith, arbitrariness, failure to
direct one’s mind to a pertinent issue,114 and bias.
The Singapore courts have not yet explicitly recognised what subtly took
place in these cases, namely, that they expanded the deﬁnition of unconstitu-
tionality in the manner described above to include violations of norms other
than those explicitly enumerated in the Constitution. The High Court’s decision
in Nagaenthran did not have occasion to engage with this point either, evi-
dently because the applicant did not raise it. It is hoped that this point will
be taken up in future: the expanded deﬁnition of unconstitutionality could
potentially mean that, even if ouster clauses are constitutionally valid and
are held to eﬀectively oust judicial review of errors of law within jurisdiction,
there could still be various unwritten constitutional norms providing
minimum standards to which all exercises of executive power must adhere.
6. Conclusion
We have analysed the High Court’s reasoning in Nagaenthran and identiﬁed
several problems with it, which, if left unchecked, may have the eﬀect of
undermining the fundamental principle of constitutional supremacy as well
as the constitutional role of the Judiciary. We have presented arguments to
the eﬀect that the High Court ought to have held that ouster clauses are
unconstitutional under Singapore law and, in particular, cannot be allowed
to grant executive decision-makers a licence to commit non-jurisdictional
errors of law. Finally, we have argued that the eﬀect of these problems is




114On a related note, the Court of Appeal has also held that ‘tak[ing] into account irrelevant considerations’
is a violation of the guarantee of equality before the law under Article 12(1) of the Constitution: Rama-
lingam (n 80) [23].
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tempered by the potential for a wider deﬁnition of unconstitutionality as a
ground of review than was canvassed before the High Court. It is respectfully
hoped that the Singapore courts may address all of these issues more robustly
in future.
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